Eidelberg on moral relativism

A lengthy excerpt from Eidelberg's On the Silence of the Declaration of Independence (1976):

The Declaration silently yet eloquently affirms the power of reason to apprehend universal moral truths or standards by which to determine whether any form of government is just or unjust. Relativism denies this power of reason. It thereby denies any moral justification for the Revolution or indeed for any revolution . . . . The Declaration proclaims that all men are created equal, meaning that all men are subject to the same universal moral law, as a consequence of which no group of men can rightly rule other men as if they were an inferior species. In contrast, relativism fosters the notion that all values or moralities are in principle equal, from which it follows that free societies are not intrinsically superior to slave societies.

. . .Relativism reduces or lowers reason to the pragmatic level. As a result, men become more and more preoccupied with the immediate, with narrow and limited interests. In the process, reason becomes little more than the clever, calculating instrument of the consuming desires. So long as the metaphysical reason had some efficacy, or to the extent that the intuition that man is a metaphysical animal influenced human conduct, a sense of dignity (or of shame) imposed restraints on men's appetites. As men's appetites expand, their intellects shrink. To put the matter another way, with the inevitable decline of honor under the education of moral relativism, there is a corresponding decline in men's respect for reason and truth. Let one generation after another be taught . . . that reason is incapable of discovering universal truths or standards by which to determine whether one form of government is intrinsically superior to another, and the will and determination of that people to persevere in any cause involving death and destruction will be undermined. Wholehearted dedication to any cause is psychologically impossible among men tainted by moral relativism.

. . . . [E]xceedingly few people have the courage, let alone the intellectual capacity, to be thoroughly consistent moral relativists. That would be nihilism, pure and simple. In fact, most relativists are rather conventional. Thus, while many will openly deny the existence of universal moral truths, hardly anyone would publicly avow the conclusion that "everything is permitted." . . . Consequently, there is no reason to be disconcerted or misled should one find in the writings or utterances of most relativists, especially of those who are elected officials, the semblance of ordinary morality.

. . . . It should be understood . . . that relativism does not logically entail contemporary liberalism. Hence one should not be too surprised to find relativists among "conservatives." Furthermore, a relativist can be, and often is, a "moralist" or secular humanist; and here is where his relativism may become almost invisible even to himself. (pp 30–32)

Eidelberg goes on to distinguish "moralist" from "realist" relativism. Moralist relativism tends to be identified with pacifism:

Any coherent morality must be rooted in a single principle. The principle may be an ultimate good, a summum bonum, toward which one strives, such as happiness; or it may be an ultimate evil, a summum malum, from which one flees, such as violent death. Following Hobbes, the relativist cannot possibly accept the former, if only because there is no agreement even among philosophers as to what constitutes happiness. He is therefore compelled, consciously or otherwise, to take his ultimate bearing on the latter, the summum malum, if only because the bulk of mankind, under a secular dispensation, will agree with Hobbes that the greatest evil is violent death. And so the relativist who happens to be a moralist will seek peace above all other values. But what is this "peace"? . . . [I]t is little more than the absence of strife, the "little more" being ease and comfort. For it goes without saying that men are not content merely to live; they want to live commodiously. Thus, beneath the surface of the relativistic moralist is a benign hedonism . . .

If, however, the relativist happens to be a "realist," he will tend to trivialize and obscure the moral differences between just and unjust regimes by contending that their "ideologies" and appeals to universalist principles are but devices for securing domestic solidarity and international support for what are in fact material interests. What really animates nations is not moral principle but the desire for power. Here the realist is on solid Hobbesian grounds where he joins the moralist. Their difference lies essentially in this: The moralist accepts the empirical or descriptive conclusion of the realist, but only as a contingent and alterable fact of international relations. Here the moralist parts company with Hobbes. He recognizes that the desire for power breeds fear and suspicion among nations and so can lead to the greatest of evils, violent death in war. But he maintains . . . that the desire for power is not an unalterable ingredient of human nature, which is basically benign. (Enter Rousseau.) For the moralist, the desire for power . . . is merely a manifestation of human insecurity having its origin either in economic or in psychological deprivation. Universalist moral doctrines, those intolerant, dogmatic ideologies which breed fear and distrust among nations, aggravate this insecurity by stimulating or magnifying the desire for power . . . .

By obscuring the distinction between the legal and the just . . . both realists and moralists seem to be fostering a morality of the status quo. But the truth is more complex . . . . To render compatible two nations governed by conflicting ideologies, it will be necessary to change their political, social, economic, and, above all, their educational institutions such that the institutions of one nation become more and more similar to those of the other. Only through a process of "convergence" requiring fundamental changes in the way of life of one or the other or both of these nations will it be possible to de-ideologize their relationship. Mutual tolerance would then be the effect more than the cause of convergence. But whatever the case, calling for mutual tolerance—the panacea of . . . moralists—obscures the real issue and is in fact a piece of hypocrisy. What the relativist moralist is really saying is this: Everyone whould be tolerant like me, should put away his dogmas, his sacred myths! . . . .

Whether a relativist is a "liberal" or a "conservative", a "moralist" or a "realist," a "dove" or a "hawk," or some combination thereof—for political preferences are ultimately as fortuitous to him as matters of taste—then, all other things being equal, he cannot possibly be as fully dedicated to a cause as one who believes in the intrinsic justice and universal validity of that cause. As Nietzsche so well understood, relativism, by debasing one's own values, weakens the personality and tends to paralyze the will . . . . In a protracted struggle requiring material sacrifice and the loss of life itself, the relativist's spirit will falter, be he citizen or statesman. Modern men will fight and die for what they believe to be true. But only the deluded would persevere in a struggle for an ideology which cannot be shown to be morally superior to that of any nation which threatens their own . . . .

Relativism may or may not be true. But like Nietzsche, I believe I have shown that relativism is deadly. (pp 33–36)