Burke on the democratic element

Edmund Burke strongly upheld the mixed constitution of 18th century Britain, with its monarchical, aristocratic and democratic (or at least popular) elements. To those who insist on unfettered or "Volkskammer" democracy as their ideal, Burke, who by the standards of his time was fairly liberal, is now likely to seem a reactionary. Modern democrats might be surprised, however, if they looked at what Burke says about the popular element of the mixed constitution in his Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents. His basic position is that while the popular element should not overwhelm the other two, the popular representative institution itself should nevertheless be genuinely popular—not vitiated by aristocratic or monarchical tendencies. It is not for the popular assembly to check popular excesses: that is a role for other institutions. Furthermore, the power of this assembly should also be very real, including not only a legislative veto but the ability to remove an unpopular government at short notice; this is the basic means of preserving "that great and only foundation of Government, the confidence of the people". By Burke's standards, the modern Westminster-style Commons, to take a notable example, falls well short of being a popular representative organ. Those who would like to make up the "democratic deficit" might do well to consider how the Commons or other popular assembly could be remolded to Burkean standards.

A key point for Burke (also emphasized by Harvey Mansfield) is that the Commons should not act as or participate in government, but serve as a separate check or "controul" on the government. The modern Commons, by contrast, is fused with the executive; this leaves government unchecked except by extra-parliamentary institutions such as the mass media.

The House of Commons was supposed originally to be no part of the standing Government of this country. It was considered as a controul, issuing immediately from the people, and speedily to be resolved into the mass from whence it arose. In this respect it was in the higher part of Government what juries are in the lower.

This checking institution should also have a transitory character in order to feel closer to the people than the "remoter and more permanent parts of Legislature" such as the upper house or Lords. The Commons should be "the express image of the feelings of the nation"—feelings which Burke regards as a basically sound guide to whether the government is doing its job properly (though not to the construction of alternative policies). Burke makes the ideal Commons sound like an amateur body, and regrets the tendencies towards professionalization which were already observable in the eighteenth century. Ideally, the Commons should be subject to frequent re-election (if this does not cause too much political turmoil); its sessions should also not take up a large proportion of each year, as if they do the Commons will tend to be drawn towards the character of a ruling Senate. Unfortunately, the volume of business has already, in the eighteenth century, made long parliamentary sessions necessary.

If we compare this ideal with contemporary realities, we find "representative" assemblies whose members spend large parts or even all of their careers as full-time politicians, living in a considerable degree of isolation from those who elected them. This is now the case both in Britain and the United States, for example. In Britain, the representatives are in addition bound by a party discipline that is so tight as to negate the whole purpose of the institution. One can tell what Burke would have thought of this: a "rule of indiscriminate support to all Ministers" (which is exactly what we have under majority Westminster-style government) would indicate "the principle of Parliament to be totally corrupted", Burke observes. The Commons will not reflect the "confidence of the people" in the government of the day where each MP is professionally bound to support or oppose it, irrespective of what the people think.

The American type of legislative assembly at least has the advantage that its members are not tightly bound by this pathological party discipline. This relative independence of party control stems from the absence of a "confidence convention" under the American system, and from the fact that the American assembly does not elect the executive, so that members or prospective members of the assembly do not have to pledge to support a specific executive when they seek election. Thus it may appear that the best way of restoring some degree of popular representation under the Westminster model would be to establish, in addition to the existing Commons, an American-style legislative chamber holding a veto on legislation but without the power to remove the government. (More precisely, such an assembly's legislative veto would probably have to be limited to non-money bills, or to non-money bills together with tax and expenditure increases: otherwise, an opposition party with a majority in the assembly could topple the government by withholding necessary funds. The Canadian populist reformers' proposal to create an elected Senate may fit these requirements.)

There are indications, however, that Burke would not think this approach was adequate. Burke appears to regard the ability to remove unpopular governments (and perhaps individual unpopular members of governments) as the essential popular power, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) the ability to block unpopular legislation.

The due arrangement of men in the active [executive] part of the State, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise Government, ought to be among its very first and dearest objects.

An American-style legislative assembly, whether as part of a Presidential system of government or as an extension attached to the Westminster model, would leave the head of government directly elected by the people for a term of several years. During this time, the President or Prime Minister is able to rule in a way which bears striking resemblances to the system of Court rule which it was Burke's main purpose to condemn in writing the Thoughts. The modern executive, unlike the eighteenth-century king, is of course electorally accountable. Yet Burke's basic strictures against one-man rule seem equally applicable to a modern "Prime Minister's Office" as to a king's court:

. . . that form of Government, which, neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trust-worthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of it.

. . . . Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from Government, and not to trust for the safety of the State to subsequent punishment alone: punishment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain; and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

(Emphasis added.) The prospect of subsequent electoral "punishment" would not, then, seem to be sufficient to ensure that a Prime Minister will choose the right personnel to run or advise his government. On the contrary, such advisors will tend to be chosen for their personal loyalty to the chief executive, secured by their lack of any political influence not derived from him; and Burke believes that this is to choose the unqualified.

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends, or who losing it has no friends to sympathize with him; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it; is a person who ought never to be suffered by a controuling Parliament to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; because such a man has no connexion with the interest of the people.

It follows that what would appear to be necessary, to restore popular representation as envisaged by Burke, would be to establish a popular assembly that could somehow remain more or less free of party domination even if it had the power, not only to block unpopular legislation, but to dismiss unpopular governments.